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n  Several states imposed time limits 
for welfare receipt in the wake of the 
Great Recession.
n  Stricter time limits decreased 
welfare participation by 22 percent 
and transfer income by 6 percent.
n  The time limits tend to decrease 
earnings in states without generous 
benefits at baseline.
n  Separation from work and welfare 
diminishes families’ access to financial 
resources.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/329/.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) established the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program 
within the United States, replacing the previous welfare program of Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of TANF was that 
it mandated a lifetime limit of 60 months for federal cash assistance. States, however, 
reserve the right to set stricter time limits or to continue to fund TANF caseloads beyond 
60 months using their own funds. During the 2010s, several states imposed TANF 
time limits for the frst time or made existing time limits more stringent. Te reforms 
counted families’ existing months on welfare, so families beyond the time limit could 
lose eligibility and access immediately. As TANF requires most benefciaries to work (or 
prepare for work), families losing eligibility may also lose incentives to fnd employment. 
Comparing states that changed time limits to those that did not, I fnd that stricter 
time limits decreased annual TANF participation by 22 percent and annual transfer 
income by 6 percent among single mothers without college degrees, who make up 
most of the TANF population. Moreover, stricter TANF time limits did not increase 
employment or earnings among single mothers in states without generous programs 
at baseline. My fndings suggest that TANF work requirements can efectively increase 
work participation and that removing TANF eligibility may reduce this participation. 
Consequently, decreased TANF generosity diminishes these families’ access to fnancial 
resources. 
TANF Background 
TANF is a means-tested cash transfer program for families with children. Income, 
assets, and household size determine households’ eligibility for monthly cash assistance. 
States set all policy parameters and administer TANF payments. However, they 
receive about half of their funding from the federal government if they meet spending 
requirements and have specifed portions of their TANF caseloads engaged in work-
related activities, such as employment and job training. States may not allocate federal 
funding to children or adults in households that have received TANF for 60 months or 
more. However, as mentioned above, states may continue to fund TANF cases beyond 60 
months using their own funds, or they may implement shorter TANF time limits. While 
a few states allow all benefciaries to remain on TANF indefnitely, states more ofen 
grant certain groups of individuals exemptions from or extensions to their time-limit 
policies. For instance, many states extend time limits for victims of domestic violence 
and individuals who are ill or incapacitated. 
Arizona, Kansas, Maine, and Michigan—henceforth, “the analysis states”—changed 
their lifetime TANF time limits between 2010 and 2016. Arizona shortened its time limit 
from 60 to 12 months gradually between July 2010 and July 2016. Similarly, Kansas, 
which originally had a 60-month time limit, phased in a 24-month time limit between 
November 2011 and July 2016. Maine, which previously had no time limit, implemented 
a 60-month time limit in January 2012. Michigan implemented a 60-month time limit 
for the frst time in 2011. In all these cases, the new time-limit policies were announced 
within a year of their implementation. Individuals who had already reached the states’ 
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Efects of Welfare Time Limits 
All individuals in 
households that had 
reached their time limits, 
including children, were 
removed from TANF 
shortly afer time limits 
were implemented. 
new time limits were then notifed. All individuals in households that had reached their 
time limits, including children, were removed from TANF shortly afer the time limits 
were implemented. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the analysis states implemented stricter TANF 
time-limit policies in response to economic difculties, which became particularly 
acute in the absence of federal supports afer the Great Recession. Specifcally, during 
Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010, states could receive additional federal TANF funds through 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which allocated $5 
billion toward emergency TANF spending. But when ARRA appropriations ended in 
2011, some state governments found themselves struggling to fund TANF caseloads. In 
particular, the analysis states were experiencing budget shortfalls as they changed their 
time-limit policies (Olif, Mai, and Palacios 2012). For example, the Arizona Department 
of Economic Security’s budget was cut by over 31 percent between the beginning 
of Fiscal Year 2009 and the end of Fiscal Year 2010 (Brewer and Young 2013), and 
Michigan forecast nearly $75 million in cost savings because of time-limit case closures 
during Fiscal Year 2012 (Carley 2011). In light of these budget problems and the high 
unemployment rates in the wake of the Great Recession, state fnancial issues, rather than 
lack of need for safety-net benefts, seem to have driven states to change their TANF time 
limits. 
Time limits are not the only margin along which states can infuence TANF program 
design. Each state sets its own income eligibility requirements, beneft levels, and 
work requirements for recipients. For example, many states require recipients without 
very young children to engage in work-related activities, such as employment and job 
training, for at least 30 hours a week. TANF generosity varies considerably across the 
analysis states. As of 2009, three-person families with up to $1,023 in monthly income 
could be eligible for TANF benefts in Maine, but only those with less than $600 in 
monthly income could be eligible for benefts in Arizona and Kansas. Maximum monthly 
benefts for three-person families were $278 in Arizona, $429 in Kansas, $485 in Maine, 
and $492 in Michigan. In addition, Maine, Kansas, and Michigan exempted parents of 
children 12, 6, and 3 months or younger, respectively, from work requirements, while 
Arizona did not exempt any parents from work requirements on the basis of the age of 
their children. 
Efects on TANF Participation 
I use state-level administrative data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and household-level survey data from the American Community Survey 
to analyze trends in TANF participation from 2007 through 2016. Te administrative 
data document the number of adult TANF recipients for each state by month, and the 
survey data document individuals’ demographics and economic outcomes, including 
TANF benefts within the past year. I compare how TANF participation varies over 
time between the analysis states and the rest of the country through two approaches: 
1) synthetic control and 2) diference-in-diferences. Both approaches attempt to make 
the comparison states similar to the analysis states during the period before the policy 
change—tighter time limits—takes efect, in order to control for other factors that could 
afect the outcomes. 
Figure 1 shows the estimated efect of stricter time-limit policies on monthly adult 
TANF receipt, using the HHS data for Arizona, Kansas, and Michigan. (I do not display 
results from Maine because of issues with its HHS data. See the working paper for more 
details.) In the top lef panel of Figure 1, the solid line shows, by month, the number of 
adult TANF recipients per 100 adult residents of Arizona, which hovered around 0.4 
before Arizona shortened its time limit beginning in 2010. Afer the policy change, the 
ratio decreases to less than 0.3, and it continues to decrease to less than 0.1 by 2016. Te 
dashed line, constructed using data from the comparison states, approximates TANF 
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State fnancial issues, 
rather than lack of need 
for safety-net benefts, 
seem to have driven states 
to change their TANF 
time limits. 
Figure 1  Tighter Time Limits on TANF Eligibility Reduce Caseloads in Arizona, 
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NOTE: Graphs show the number of TANF recipients per 100 adults by month in analysis states and their synthetic 
control groups. 
SOURCE: Author’s estimates using data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Ofce of Family 
Assistance. 
and dashed lines agree quite closely before 2010, they diverge immediately afer Arizona 
changes its time limit, and by 2016 the gap implies a 48 percent decrease in Arizona’s 
TANF participation from what it would have been with no change in time limits. 
Te top right and bottom lef panels of Figure 1 show the estimated efects of stricter 
time-limit policies in Kansas and Michigan, respectively. Similar to the 48 percent 
decrease in Arizona, monthly TANF participation decreases by 30 percent in Kansas and 
39 percent in Michigan. 
To isolate the population afected by TANF policies, I use the survey data to limit 
the sample to single mothers without college degrees, who make up most of the TANF 
population. I fnd that stricter time limits decrease annual TANF participation within 
this group by 22 percent. 
Efects on Access to Financial Resources 
Given the dramatic decreases in TANF participation brought on by stricter time 
limits, I also investigate the impact on fnancial resources through the efects on work, 
income, and participation in other safety-net programs among single mothers without 
college degrees. I fnd that stricter time-limit policies decrease annual TANF benefts by 
30 percent. Consistent with the eligibility link between TANF and SNAP (food stamps), 
participation in the latter program also decreases—in this case by 6 percent. Te efects 
on work vary across the analysis states: employment increases by 2.7 percentage points 
in Maine, but stricter time limits have virtually no efect on employment in Arizona and 
Kansas, and they decrease employment by 3.1 percentage points in Michigan. 
Tese diferent employment efects could result from a few factors. First, 
macroeconomic conditions may afect the ability of TANF recipients to work more as 
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Efects of Welfare Time Limits 
When we jointly consider 
the impacts on work, 
taxes, and SNAP benefts, 
however, it appears that 
stricter time limits tend to 
decrease overall income 
for afected households. 
TANF generosity decreases. For example, Michigan experienced particularly widespread 
unemployment during the Great Recession. It is plausible that TANF-vulnerable women 
in Michigan tried to work more afer the TANF time limit took efect, but that they were 
unable to secure jobs. Second, preexisting diferences in TANF policies may interact 
with caseload demographics in determining employment efects. For instance, as of 
2009, Maine’s TANF program had no time limit, a high maximum income threshold 
for eligibility, a relatively generous maximum beneft, and the most generous work 
exemptions of the four analysis states for parents of very young children. Tis suggests 
that TANF-vulnerable mothers in Maine likely had stronger underlying labor market 
potential than their counterparts in the other analysis states. When we jointly consider 
the impacts on work, taxes, and SNAP benefts, however, it appears that stricter time 
limits tend to decrease overall income for afected households. 
Policy Implications 
To the extent that work, income, and program participation proxy for access to 
fnancial resources, my results imply that policymakers should consider macroeconomic 
conditions and caseload demographics before altering TANF policies such as time limits. 
While stricter time limits may lead to substantial government cost savings through 
decreased TANF (and SNAP) participation, such changes may also substantially reduce 
the living standards of low-income families. In states without generous TANF programs, 
welfare recipients ofen have poor work prospects to begin with, especially during times 
of widespread unemployment. Removing such individuals from TANF likely inhibits 
their access to fnancial resources and decreases their overall well-being. 
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